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BOOK REVIEW
By James Marshall. Indi1966. Pp. xi, 119. $5.95.

LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT.

anapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

It is surely estimable to try to bring anything in this world closer
to reality; the book under review is written in an effort to bring the
law closer to reality. The author, James Marshall, believes that the
law is much farther from reality than it need be, given the current
knowledge of reality, or of certain of its highly relevant aspects,
available to the law in other fields. In this volume the field of psychology is credited with such knowledge, and the bulk of the content is the description and exposition, from investigations in psychology, of facts that bear especially upon what happens in the courtroom during a trial. The facts pertain very largely, although by no
means exclusively, to the credibility of the testimony of witnesses
regarding the accuracy of their recall.
The author critically explores the relationship of such facts to
the rules governing the admissibility of evidence through testimony.
He also considers psychological facts that bear upon the way in
which judge and jury may evaluate, remember, and be influenced
by the witness, his evidence, and the way in which that evidence is
presented. The author has made himself familiar with an impressive array of facts from psychology, and he presents a detailed account of his own research which offers some new insights into the
factors related to recall. Both sets of facts are relevant to legal procedure, especially to procedure in trials, and the author draws upon
both individual and social psychology.
It is a useful and challenging undertaking to survey and report
upon recent and older work in psychology in areas which can be
shown to shed light on what happens in the courtroom. Work in
recall, group dynamics, and the making of decisions of all kinds
might well suggest a bringing up to date of Hugo Munsterberg,
whose classic work1 the author refers to with admiration.!
Whose memory is to be trusted, and under what conditions?
Whose judgment is to be trusted, and under what conditions? What
factors determine that one remembers or forgets this or that? What
conditions affect the way one person appraises another? What determines that one decides this rather than that? What determines
1 MUNSERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908).
2
MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 2-3 (1966).
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that one adopts an opinion, or changes an opinion previously held?
There is indeed much recent work in psychology on such questions,
and all of these things are presently going on in the courtroom.
The author has chosen the studies that seem to him most relevant to
these questions as they pertain to the processes of justice and, consequently, to the harmony between those processes and reality.
There is a foreword by Lee Loevinger 3 in which is considered
briefly the general problem, in human life as a whole, of attaining
harmony with reality, as well as the underlying problem of knowing reality. Here the reader comes upon the needed recognition
that profound epistemological issues in the broadest sense underlie
the more specific problems dealt with in the text. The attack of
the text proper is at three levels, each being the relationship of one
aspect of the law to reality: the first, jurisprudence as a whole; the
second, courtroom procedure in general; and the third, the rules of
evidence. The bulk of the book deals with the third level.
Ideally, one would suppose, a review of such a book would explore and reveal how its general thesis or detailed assertions might
strike the legal reader, for it is the foundations of his profession
which are brought into question, and it is he who would know best
what those foundations are, whether they are fairly represented in
this volume as objects of attack, and whether the facts adduced from
psychology affect those foundations to the extent the author contends they do. This reviewer knows far less about the law than the
author knows about psychology; the author knows many facts about
memory, recall, inference, and judgment that are, he believes, relevant to the credibility of witnesses and therefore to the rules about
such credibility and about the admissibility of evidence. The reviewer, in contrast, knows no facts about the rules; he does not even
know what the rules are. The author reveals them only tangentially, by way of introducing his attacks upon them.
Where is the locus of the conflict between psychology and the
law, as the author sees it? Is it in the very principles of justice
themselves, or is it at the point where the law should acknowledge
and use certain psychological facts that bear upon the successful or
unsuccessful working of the particular processes held necessary to
implement these principles? To locate the conflict in the principles
of justice would raise the gravest questions about the hierarchy of
divisions of human knowledge and practice and the relations among
them - questions of the sort recently raised anew and masterfully
3 Loevinger, Foreword to id., at vii-ix.
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dealt with by Michael Polanyi in the most general way as well as
with specific reference to jurisprudence and the principles of justice,
in his critical survey of the whole sweep of human cognition. To
locate the conflict in the principles of justice would bring us to the
issue of reductionism. Whatever the author may say about the
principles of justice - and he does suggest at times that the conflict
is there also, as shown by his complaints about the theological connotations of "right" and "wrong" - he devotes himself in his developed exposition almost wholly to the particular processes, that is,
to "technique."
His conclusion, for example, runs this way: "Above all, what is
indicated is establishment of a closer relationship between law and
psychology, and participation by lawyers and psychologists in empirical research into the processes of the law. This is practically
non-existent, and it is curious in view of the common deductive approach of both science and the law."'
Marshall believes that the law is much farther away from reality than the natural sciences are. They are his ideal, to such a degree that there is throughout the volume a disturbing suggestion of
naive faith that one could immediately transfer the special method
of these sciences to the law and apply their findings directly. Edward S. Robinson decided thirty years ago that such a view proves
to be a constant source of disappointment. The findings of psychologists about memory, for example, had not seemed capable of
direct assimilation into the evaluation of legal testimony. Too many
factors are always involved in the particular case; what the findings
can do, at best, is to provide guides to better judgment.' Speaking
4

POLANyI, PMRONAL KNOWIEDGE 54, 223-24, 278, 308-09, 348, 377, 380
(1958); POLANYI, Tn- STUDY O1' MAN 71,92 (1959).
5 MARSHALI, op. cit. supranote 2, at 103.
6Id. at 103-04. To be told that it is non-existent indicates that what seemed to some,
at the time, a beginning of the relationship he advocates, never lived beyond its em-

bryonic stage. I refer to the collaboration that produced the book, Law and the Lawyers,
by Edward S. Robinson in 1935.

Robinson was professor of psychology at Yale Uni-

versity and a lecturer in the Yale School of Law. His book was an effort to systematically cultivate that area common to jurisprudence and psychology. The primary stimulus
to the undertaking was Robinson's several years of participation in a seminar on the
social psychology of judicial institutions with Thurman W. Arnold and the graduate
students of the Yale School of Law and his collaboration with Arnold in a course of

legal ethics given to first-year students. It is curious that Marshall nowhere mentions
that volume, a wise, searching, and altogether elegant treatment of the theoretical and
conceptual and factual basis for just such a collaboration as he proposes. It was part of
what was called by its proponents the realistic movement in American jurisprudence.
7 RoBiNsoN, LAw AND THE IAwYRts 9-14 (1935).

discussion of this work.

See note 6 supra for further

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

1432

[Vol. 18: 1429

of his own findings that accuracy and amount of recall are related
to socio-education status,' to time elapse,9 and to the personality factor of punitiveness,"0 Marshall comments that there is little a trial
court can do to relate accuracy of recall to these variables." But
one is left uncertain whether he takes that to mean that some other
legal procedure must be found that would replace the trial court some procedure in which accuracy of recall could be related to these
variables in such a way that a more just decision would be reached.
The tenor of his discussion does sound in harmony with that view.
There recurs throughout the author's discussions an inclination
to set scientific inquiry apart from free inquiry in general, in a way
that imputes kind rather than degree to the difference. He loses
sight of the fact that science is a more precise application of the general method of inquiry or, one might say, that we more readily call
a field scientific, the more it is able to make precise and quantifiable
its own steps in the general method of inquiry. This separation
leads him, for example, to describe what he views as a sharp distinction between the rules that a jury must follow and those that scientists follow. When there is a gap in the knowledge necessary to
reach a conclusion, scientists try to obtain further data; jurors cannot do this except in a most restricted way.'" One asks: are scientists never in that position, and when they are, do they never arrive
at a conclusion by filling in the gaps with rumor or opinion, as he
says jurors are led into doing? Moreover, scientists are not always
aware that there is a gap; sometimes it is the genius who must show
them that there is one where no one recognized it before.
Marshall complains that a trial is not a scientific or philosophical quest for truth, but that testimony is constantly dissected, contradicted, and reshaped toward partisan ends.'" It is a bitter proceeding. This sounds to him very different from science. He seems to
view science, as many contemporary people do, as an objective, impersonal, machine-like process in which the scientist acts rather like
a tender and manipulator of something conceived of as the scientific
method, which is kept in operation without any peculiar personal
passion, commitment, rivalry, or intrigue and with a passion for dis8 MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 48-50.

9Id. at 53-55.
0

Id.
11Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
1

at 70-79.
at 81.
at 14.
at 7.
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interested service of the truth, unaffected by the unconscious or conscious narrower motives that impair the activities of lesser mortals.
I must say that much of his description, along these lines, of the
conflict between psychology and the law, sounded to me very like
a description of conflict within psychology itself, as well as within
other sciences - a conflict rooted in opposing philosophies of science and reality.
The author complains that lawyers tend to dispose of variables
and diversities by rationalizations and by attempts to fit the individual man into a logical formula. Presumably, attention to psychology, and perhaps especially to the psychology of personality, would
make them quit doing this. Little does he seem to regard, in suggesting this, the continuing struggle within psychology on the part
of the individualist, phenomenological, morphological, existentialist, and idiographic psychologists against the formulistic, nomothetic,
and group-statistical psychologists.
In connection with that, and with the question of just how he
sees the findings of psychology as being applicable to legal procedures, it seems to me that the author comes perilously dose to sounding as though he advocated, on occasion, the fitting of witnesses into formulae - the fitting that he deplores elsewhere. He tells us
how prejudice toward a particular segment of the population to
which a witness may belong comes into play in a juror's evaluation
of that witness' testimony.1" He goes on to show how this has been
fostered by the law: the courts had to rule on whether an Indian,
a Jew, or, most often, a Chinaman was per se an incompetent witness - this, he says, continued into the twentieth century. Now
comes Marshall showing in his own research that particular groups
of the population - groups set apart by certain socio-educational
conditions, role occupancies, or characteristics of personality - are
relatively more or less reliable in accuracy of recall." It is implied
that such facts should play some part in evaluating the testimony of
members of such groups. Exactly how? Is a single member of a
group to be deemed more or less entitled to credence, and his testimony to admission, according to such findings about his group?
Would not this be close to the kind of prejudice elsewhere deplored,
namely, attributing to a person, without further evidence, the characteristics of the group to which he belongs? It is an old principle
14Id. at 15-94.
'DId. at 41-81.
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among clinical psychologists that what is true for the group need
not be true for the individual in it.
I am sure that Marshall would reject any such interpretation of
his views as I have offered just now, but my regret is that his exposition does not definitely confirm me. Neither does his exposition
make as definite as one might wish what he holds about the rules.
His initial complaint was about the rules - that they do not take
into account the known facts of psychology about evidence. He says
that changing the rules will do no good; a change of spirit is
needed. 6 The reader concludes, then, that as the rules are hopeless, the trial in court, which is based upon them, must go. What
is required, in Marshall's conclusion, is social invention in the law,
based on findings of the social sciences."
The book as a whole had a surprising effect on me. Intending
to show how the law overlooks, and its rules disregard, the fallibility of human cognition, Law and Psychology in Conflict impressed
me with how remarkably sensitive the law seems to have grown to
that fallibility over the generations, as shown by the rules as I found
them described. The author's complaint is that the rules are wrong;
I found myself admiring the awareness shown, by the rules, of the
very fallibility he documents in such detail, and of the need to protect the truth against that fallibility. He succeeded in persuading
me that by its very rules, to most or all of which he objects, the
law acknowledges that man - all too often liar, self-justifier, sycophant, and illuded - must be protected from himself and from
others like him.
Perhaps the rules are wrong, and perhaps psychology could
show what rules might work better in trials, or how better rules
might be made to work elsewhere than in trials. But that is not to
say that there is conflict between science and the concern of the law
for the purposes and principles that the rules are intended to serve.
If the conflict were located there, it would be a much more serious
charge against either science or the law.
The author's central aim is, beyond a doubt, to persuade the law
to do at least one thing that science professes to do and that, more
often than not, it has moved in the direction of doing, namely, to
develop ever more penetrating and revealing sources of evidence
about facts. Marshall does not forget, and he reminds us, that the
law has also done this. For example, it no longer uses the auto-da16 Id. at
17 Ibid.

106-07.
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fe, the ordeal by fire, hot irons, water, the kangaroo court, and trial
by combat.'" Did these improvements, which surely, as the author
acknowledges, have brought the law closer to reality, come about
by use of the scientific method? In the broadest and deepest sense
of that term, yes; but in the narrower, modern sense, perhaps not.
Instead, these improvements were evolved from other modes of apprehending reality - modes, disregarded in this volume, of the sort
recently carefully expounded by the psychologist Joseph Royce in
his treatise on human cognition, The Encapsulated Man.'"
The burden of most of the book's argument almost amounts to
the thesis that no one is to be believed, and that among these, some
are to be believed less than others. What can the law do about this?
It has to use witnesses who happened to be witnesses. Yet a major
part of the author's argument is addressed to the fallibility of witnesses, and to many sources of it about which there seems little could
be done during the judicial proceedings themselves. For example,
if, as Marshall found, the habitually less punitive person has relatively inferior recall, 0 he could hardly be transformed into a habitually more punitive one during trial, in order to improve his recall.
Would not, then, a more promising line of inquiry be one that
looked directly into the questions of how any witness whatever can
be helped to be more realistic? How could testimony from the
only available witnesses, however lamentable their initial status for
testifying, be brought nearer the truth? What conditions could be
met that would foster the discovery of reality in any witness, unreliable as he might be under other conditions?
The author does call attention to the value of such questions in
his reference to a judicial reform in New Jersey that was based on
this kind of an approach.2 ' Also, among his suggested projects for
research and discussion by lawyers and social scientists jointly, he
introduces an appeal for inquiry both into changes in trial procedures that might produce greater objectivity in testimony and into
what legal procedures could be withdrawn from the courtroom and
handled differently, with the aim, again, of enhancing the realism
of the cognitive processes taking place.2
So slender a volume as this might not seem off-hand to warrant
18 Id.at 104.
9

1 RoYCE, THE ENCAPSULATED M

11-29 (1964).
MARs HIALL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 78.
21Id. at 107 n.170, citing ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSncE (1964).
20

22 MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 110.
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so extended a review, but issues of far-ranging import are explicit
and implicit in its substance. They are issues that deserve the most
careful scrutiny wherever they appear.
DWIGHT W.
*

MILES*

Associate Professor of Psychology, Western Reserve University.

